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HFH v. SUPERIOR COURT-
ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE ON THE
DILEMMA OF THE DOWNZONED PROPERTY OWNER
I. INTRODUCTION
Downzoning is the reclassification and restriction of the uses to which
specific parcels of real property may be put.' Frequently, downzoning
results in a marked reduction of the fair market value of the property
involved,2 thus raising the question of whether such action constitutes a
compensable governmental taking of private property." The California
Supreme Court decided this issue in -the negative in HFH v. Superior
Court.4 The HFH court held that neither the California nor the Federal
Constitutions require compensation be paid for the economic effects
of downzoning despite the greater protection afforded by the addition
of an "or damaged" clause in the California Constitution.'
The purpose of this comment is to illustrate that an inverse condem-
nation cause of action should be available as a protection against down-
1. See generally Michelman, Property, Utility, & Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L.R. 1165 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as Michelman]; Dunham, From Rural Enclosure to Re-enclosure of Urban Land, 35
N.Y.U.L. REv. 1238 (1960); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36
(1964); Van Alstyne, Modernizing Inverse Condemnation: A Legislative Prospectus, 8
SANTA C!LARA LAw. 1 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Van Alstyne]; Comment, Taking or
Damaging by Police Power: The Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL.
L. REv. 1 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Taking]; Griggs v. Allegheny County
in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 SuP. CT. REV.
63 [hereinafter cited as Griggs in Perspective]; Takings, Private Property and Public
Rights, 81 YALE LJ. 149 (1971). These commentaries present the leading discussion on
the subject of downzoning.
2. See Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants Nuisance Rules and Fines as
Land Use Controls, 40 U. Cm. L. REV. 681 (1973), noting that "[t]he effect of these
policies is significant since zoning often affects land values by multiples, not fractions."
Id. at 699.
3. CAL. CoNsT. art. 1, § 19 reads in pertinent part:
Private property may be taken or damages for public use only when just com-
pensation, ascertained by a jury unless waived, has first been paid to, or into court
for, the owner.
Id. The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution also limits the state's
power. See note 23 infra.
4. 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365, cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1495
(1975).
5. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 19; see notes 36-41 infra and accompanying text.
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zoning regulation. Presently, non-monetary relief is the sole remedy
available to a property owner injured by downzoning.6 As a result, the
courts are forced to choose between upholding a presumptively desira-
ble zoning ordinance at the expense of an individual property owner,
and upholding the individual's property rights by sacrificing the ordi-
nance. An answer to this dilemma would be to grant the property
owner the remedy of inverse condemnation.
11. BM V. SUPERIOR COURT
Underlying the plaintiffs' claim in HFH was the decision of the City
of Cerritos to rezone two contiguous parcels of real estate from C-2,
(neighborhood commercial), to RS 6500, (single family residential, one
unit per 6500 square feet). This action was challenged by the property
owners, HFH, Ltd. (HFH) and Vons Grocery Company (Vons).
HFH and Vons had conditioned their purchase of the land in question
(which was then zoned agricultural) on the acquisition by the prior
owner of commercial zoning for the property. The commercial zoning
was obtained and the transaction was consummated. The property was
then left undeveloped for a period of five years after which it was
temporarily rezoned as agricultural and later rezoned, on a more perma-
nent basis, as residential. Due to this latter rezoning of the property as
residential, its value fell from $388,000 to $75,000.
7
The plaintiffs brought an action for inverse condemnation alleging
that the zoning action by the city was an unconstitutional taking or
damaging of property and was, therefore, compensable.8 The Califor-
6. -FH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365,
cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1495 (1975); see also Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaven-
tura, 10 Cal. 3d 110, 514 P.2d 111, 109 Cal. Rptr. 799 (1973), where the denial of a
building permit was challenged as a taking of private property. The court held that
there was no taking and that the proper proceeding to challenge an administrative agency
was in mandamus.
For a discussion of the procedural possibilities, see Kanner, Developments in Eminent
Domain: A Candle in the Dark Corner of the Law, 52 J. URn. L. 861 (1975):
It is ironic that such a question should arise at all, particularly in California,
for the courts of California pioneered monetary recovery for excessive regulation
on inverse condemnation theory. Indeed, there is a rather well-settled line of au-
thority in which aggrieved landowners sought an injunction against the government
in an effort to halt or invalidate some governmental project or scheme, only to
be rebuffed by the courts whose response was that the owner's only remedy was
to sue in inverse condemnation for money damages.
Id. at 888 [footnotes omitted]. But see Note, Inverse Condemnation: Its Availability in
Challenging the Validity of a Zoning Ordinance, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1439 (1974).
7. 15 Cal. 3d at 512-13, 542 P.2d at 242, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 369.
8. 15 Cal. 3d at 511-12, 542 P.2d at 239-40, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 367-68.
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nia Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs had failed to allege facts
sufficient to demonstrate either a "damaging" or a "taking," holding
that the complaint did not state a cause of action in inverse condemna-
tion. 9  Despite allegations that the market value of their properties had
declined by eighty percent and that no reasonably beneficial use of the
land as residential property existed, the court concluded that the "or
damaged" provision of the California Constitution refers to physical
damage only, and that mere diminution in value is insufficient to
support an action for inverse condemnation."0
The majority based its decision on "basic considerations of reciproci-
ty" involving the benefits and burdens that one must accept in order to
participate in an "ordered" society, rather than on any "distinction
between 'taking' and 'police power.' "" Moreover, it refused to recog-
nize the possibility that, without rendering land completely useless, a
downzoning measure may randomly impose such severe restrictions
upon a property owner as to force that person to absorb more than his
fair share of the burden. The court did, however, leave open the
question of whether an inverse condemnation remedy would be available
when the regulation in question forbids substantially all use of the
land.12  Significantly, the majority opinion considered the "wrongful-
ness"1' 3 of the state action to be irrelevant in determining whether a
9. Id. at 514, 542 P.2d at 241, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 369. Thus, the plaintiffs were left
only with the possibility of non-monetary relief in the form of a writ of mandate which
might be obtained through a successful attack on the zoning ordinance as discriminatory
or arbitrary. Id. at 516 n.13, 542 P.2d at 242-43 n.13, 125 Cal. Rptr. 370-71 n.13.
10. Id. at 518 & n.15, 542 P.2d at 244 & n.15, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 372 & n.15. For an
opposing position see id. at 523, 542 P.2d at 248, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 376 (Clark, J.,
dissenting).
11. Id. at 522, 542 P.2d at 247, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
12. Id. at 518 n.16, 542 P.2d at 244 n.16, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 372 n.16:
This case does not present, and we therefore do not decide, the question of entitle-
ment to compensation in the event a zoning regulation forbade substantially all
use of the land in question. We leave the question for another day.
Id., 542 P.2d at 244 n.16, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 372 n.16. That "other day" was quickly
upon the court in Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto, 51 Cal. App. 3d 726, 124 Cal. Rptr. 547
(1975), rehearing granted, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613 (1976).
13. 15 Cal. 3d at 516 n.13, 542 P.2d at 242-43 n.13, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 370-71 n.13.
If such a reduction constituted an injury, it would occur regardless of the legality
of the zoning action occasioning it: indeed we have held that the wrongfulness
of the state's action is irrelevant in an inverse condemnation case. . . . Thus,
if plaintiffs have suffered an injury cognizable under California Constitution, article
I, section 19, they stand entitled to compensation regardless of the public agency's
wrongfulness in causing the injury. If, on the other hand, the city has acted arbi-
trarily or discriminatorily in passing the zoning ordinance of which they complain,
plaintiffs stand entitled to relief by administrative mandate.
Id., 542 P.2d at 242-43 n.13, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 370-71 n.13. Thus, it appears that
"wrongful" zoning, for example, arbitrary or discriminatory zoning, is remedied by an
action in mandamus. The court fails to define "wrongfulness."
[Vol. 10
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taking or damaging of property has occurred. Rather, according to the
court, the critical inquiry rests on whether a legally compensable injury
has occurred.: 4
The approach taken by the court was based in part on the difficulty of
ascertaining at which point the burden imposed upon the landowner
became so unreasonable as to allow an action for inverse condemnation.
Instead, the court deferred resolution of the issue to the legislature.' 5
This fear by the court of "legislating" did not appear to deter
dissenting Justice Clark. In his view, the fairness of the burden shoul-
dered by the individual must be balanced a'gainst the demands of
society.' 6 He proposed a tripartite test to determine when compensation
might be required in downzoning situations. The test considers the
substantiality of the decrease in value, the duration of the decrease, and
whether the owner would incur more than his fair share of the financial
burdenY. Justice Clark applied this test to this factual situation and
concluded that the eighty percent diminution in market value, despite
the nonphysical nature of the invasion, was sufficient to state a cause of
action in inverse condemnation.: 8
III. BACKGROUND: POLICE POWER v. EMINENT DOMAIN
Land use control is exercised by local governments as part of their
14. Id. Contra, Aaron v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal. App. 3d 471, 115 Cal. Rptr.
162 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975), where, in an inverse condemnation
action for loss of property value as a result of jet noise, the court held that the airport
owner would be liable for a taking or damaging where "the interference is sufficiently
direct and sufficiently peculiar that the owner, if uncompensated, would pay more than
his proper share to the public undertaking." Id. at 484, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 170.
15. That we do not do so [redefine the constitutional requirements of just compen-
sation] reflects less our belief that no problems exist with the present law in this
area than our conviction that legislative rather than judicial action holds the key
to any useful reform.
15 Cal. 3d at 521, 542 P.2d at 246-47, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 374-75. See also United States
v. New River Collieries Co., 262 U.S. 341 (1923); Monongahela Navigation Co. v.
United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893); County of Los Angeles v. Ortiz, 6 Cal. 3d 141, 490
P.2d 1142, 98 Cal. Rptr. 454 (1971); Beals v. City of Los Angeles, 23 Cal. 2d 381, 144
P.2d 839 (1943).
16. 15 Cal. 3d at 524-25, 542 P.2d at 248-49, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 376-77 (Clark, J.,
dissenting).
17. Id. at 526, 542 P.2d at 250, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 378. This analysis presumes the
validity of the zoning ordinance; the court would still have alternatives, including:
(1) compensating the landowner for the decrease in value;
(2) paying total value for the land and acquiring title;
(3) rescinding the downzoning.
Id, at 527, 542 P.2d at 250, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
18. Id., 542 P.2d at 250, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 379.
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inherent police power, 19 to promote the health, safety, morals, 'or general
welfare of the community.20 The states exercise such control in two
ways. First, a governmental entity may simply take private property
and put it to a particular public use by exercising the power of eminent
domain.2 ' Secondly, it may seek, through zoning, to limit the uses to
which property may be put.
22
Various limitations, however, restrict the use of these powers. Pri-
mary among these is the constitutional requirement that private
property cannot be taken for public use without just compensa-
tion to the owner.28 Moreover, California has broadened the protection
accorded a private property owner by requiring compensation not only
where the property has been taken for public use, but where it has been
19. The police power derives from the tenth amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion, which provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitu-
tion, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." U.S. CONSr. amend. X.
In Miller v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381 (1925), the court
stated: "The police power of a state is an indispensable prerogative of sovereignty and
one that is not to be lightly limited." Id. at 484, 234 P. at 383. See also Bauer V.
County of Ventura, 45 Cal. 2d 276, 282, 289 P.2d 1 (1955).
20. See A Standard State Zoning Enabling Act and A Standard City Planning
Enabling Act, in 0. BROWDER, JR., R. CUNNINGHAM & J. JULIN, BAsIc PROPERTY LAW,
1109-1120 (2d ed. 1973). See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365, 395 (1926); Miller v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477, 484, 234 P. 381, 383
(1925).
For a discussion of the source of police power and the authority of the municipality to
zone land uses, see Comment, Land-Use Control, Externalities, and the Municipal
Affairs Doctrine: A Border Conflict, 8 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 432, 444-51 (1975).
21. The right of eminent domain, that is, the right to take private property for
public uses, appertains to every independent government. It requires no constitu-
tional recognition; it is an attribute of sovereignty.
Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1878). See also United States v. Pewee Coal
Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951) (temporary federal seizure of coal mine operations justified to
avert national emergency); People v. Chevalier, 52 Cal. 2d 299, 304, 340 P.2d 598
(1959) (right of eminent domain is an inherent attribute of sovereignty, merely limited
in its exercise by the federal and state constitutions); Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 229,
250-51 (1861) (right of eminent domain is essential to the existence of sovereignty, and
is only regulated-not created-by the state constitution).
22. See notes 1 & 3 supra and accompanying text.
23. The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in relevant
part: "No State shall ...deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Further, the United States Supreme Court, in
Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897), held that a state is prohibited
from depriving an individual of property without compensation by the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment.
Initially the contract clause of the United States Constitution, which provides that "No
State shall . ..pass any .. .Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . ." U.S.
CONsT. art. 1, § 10, served as a further restriction on the states' right to interfere with
1977] HFH v. SUPERIOR COURT
damaged by the state.2 4 However, if a governmental action is merely a
regulation, no compensation is required.25
A. Physical Harm Requirement
The courts have upheld restrictions on land use controls as valid
exercises of the police power despite the fact that no compensation is
made to a landowner who has suffered substantial economic loss.
26
These courts have reasoned that because no physical invasion of the
property has occurred, the governmental action is a legitimate exercise of
the police power rather than an exercise of the eminent domain power."r
Thus, the distinction between eminent domain and police power is based
upon the nature of the restriction. Physical intrusions are takings; non-
physical limitations are regulations.
private contractual agreements. See Justice Marshall's opinion in Trustees of Dartmouth
College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819); but cf. Charles River Bridge v.
Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Peters) 420 (1837) (Justice Taney wrote that a contract
granting an exclusive public franchise will not be implied if it will diminish a state's
power to promote the public welfare). Note Justice Holmes' reference to the contract
clause as a limitation on governmental action in the excerpt from Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415-16 (1922), quoted at text accompanying note 76 infra.
THE FEDERALiST No. 44 (J. Madison) states that the contract clause was intended to
protect the people from the "fluctuating policy" of the legislature. A zoning change in a
comprehensive plan can be likened to a retroactive change in obligation.
24. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 19; see note 36 and text accompanying notes 36-40 infra.
25. See 1 P. NicHoLs, THE LAW OF EmINFNT DOMAIN § 1.42110] (J. Sackman 3d
rev. ed. Supp. 1976) [hereinafter cited as NIcHoLs], stating in reference to zoning
restrictions that
[t]he mere fact that the imposition of such restrictions causes a reduction in value
of property does not render it other than an incident of the exercise of a proper
sovereign power. It is not a compensable injury. The rule of damnum absque
injuria applies.
Id. at 1-193 (footnotes omitted).
See also Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370
P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962). It is noteworthy
that the appeal from the lower court was taken as a matter of right to the Supreme
Court, and was dismissed "for want of a substantial federal question." Presumably, the
Supreme Court was simply reluctant to decide the issue at that time.
26. Two California cases have reached rather different conclusions on the basis of the
police power, upholding restrictive zoning ordinances where inverse condemnation was
not claimed. Consolidated Rock Prod. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515,
370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962); McCarthy v.
City of Manhattan Beach, 41 Cal. 2d 879, 264 P.2d 932 (1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
817 (1954). For a discussion of these cases, see text accompanying notes 59-63 infra.
27. See NIcHoLs, supra note 25, § 1.42[2], at 1-123. See also Inverse Condemna-
tion, supra note 5, at 1447.
As discussed previously, the distinction between valid regulation and taking is unclear.
Micheiman, supra note 1, defines "taking" as "constitutional law's expression for any sort
of publicly inflicted private injury for which the Constitution requires payment of
compensation." Id. at 1165.
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This use of a "physical intrusion" criterion for determining whether
compensation is appropriate is unsupportable. The concept of property
in condemnation law has been expanded with the recognition that a
major attribute of property is its use, and that the denial of this use may
result in the taking of property.18  This expansion has been further
highlighted:
The only substantial difference, in such case, between restriction and
actual taking, is that the restriction leaves the owner subject to the
burden of payment of taxation, while outright confiscation would relieve
him of that burden.2
9
The traditional reason for denying compensation where a police
power regulation is involved is inapplicable to downzoning regula-
tions. The rationale for denying compensation for losses resulting from
In an attempt to formulate a rule for when compensation should issue, Michelman
examines four tests used by courts in making that determination: the "physical invasion"
test, id. at 1184, the "diminution of value" test, id. at 1190; the "balancing social gains
against private losses" test, id. at 1193; and the "harm-prevention/benefit-extraction" test,
id at 1196. He finds none of these to be acceptable, and concludes that a fairness test is
the best measure of compensability. Id. at 1197. It is sufficient for the purposes of this
Comment to recognize that if a physical invasion is not required, zoning can effect a
taking of property which may require the payment of just compensation regardless of
which test is applied.
28. See notes 40-41 infra and accompanying text. See also Pumpelly v. Green Bay
Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871), which established the principle that government
must compensate for property destroyed by its undertakings even though nothing tangible
is taken or received in the technical sense of the words. Griggs in Perspective, supra
note 1, at 82-90 contains an extensive discussion of the important cases from 1872
through 1962. See also Kanner, When is "Property" not "Property Itself": A Critical
Examination of the Bases of Denial of Compensation for Loss of Goodwill in Eminent
Domain, 6 CALIF. W.L. REV. 57, 64-71; Kanner, Condemnation Blight: Just How Just
is Just Compensation? 48 NoTRE DAME [LAw. 765] 770-87 (1973).
Thus, "property" may include not only the physical land itself, but also those rights,
powers, privileges, and immunities which are incident to its ownership. See Eaton v.
Boston, C.&.M.R.R., 51 N.H. 504, 511-12 (1872). Justice Roberts examined this
concept of "property" in United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1944):
The critical terms are "property", "taken" and "just compensation." It is con-
ceivable that the first was used in its vulgar and untechnical sense of the physical
thing with respect to which the citizen exercises rights recognized by law. On
the other hand, it may have been employed in a more accurate sense to denote
the group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to the physical thing, as the
right to possess, use and dispose of it. . . . When the sovereign exercises the
power of eminent domain it substitutes itself in relation to the physical thing in
question in place of him who formerly bore the relation to that thing, which we
denominate ownership.
Id. at 377-78. See Comment, Restrictive Covenants in Eminent Domain Proceedings:
Southern California Edison Co. v. Bourgerie, 7 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 327, 327 n.2 (1974)
for an illustration of other interests which have been deemed compensable.
29. Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 15 N.E.2d 587, 592 (CL App. N.Y. 1930).
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police power measures dates back to the 1887 case of Mugler v.
Kansas. °  The appellant in Mugler claimed that the taking of his
business under the guise of a police power regulation amounted to a
constitutional violation. The relevant statute prohibited the manufac-
ture of intoxicating liquors in Kansas to protect the community from
"the evils which confessedly result from the excessive use of ardent
spirits."'" The court held that a valid regulation could not be a
"taking" in the sense of eminent domain takings because
[a] prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are
declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or
safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking
or an appropriation of property for the public benefit.8 2
Certainly, payment of compensation following the enforcement of a
police power regulation intended to eliminate an evil, contradicts the
punitive intent of the regulation. However, comprehensive land use
plans, implemented by zoning regulations, are not limited to outlawing
noxious or illegal uses of property or eliminating activity which is, in
itself, injurious to the community.13  The purpose of this zoning is to
relocate a use; not to eliminate it.84 A policy of denying compensation
for the elimination of uses by land use zoning results in unintended
harm and redistribution of wealth. As a result, the consequences of
confining the remedies for impairment of land use pursuant to zoning
regulations to non-monetary relief are undesirably and unnecessarily
restrictive.
30. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
31. Id. at 662.
32. Id. at 668-69.
33. Miller v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477, 487, 234 P. 381, 384 (1925), ap-
peal dismissed, 273 U.S. 781 (1927).
34. As Justice Sutherland commented, it is concerned with "a right thing in the wrong
place, -like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard." Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
This distinction between "taking" under eminent domain and "regulating" under the
police power was recently discussed by a federal court in a situation regarding land use
regulations. In Smoke Rise, Inc. v. Washington Suburban San. Comm'n., 400 F. Supp.
1369 (D. Md. 1975), the plaintiff land developers brought an action to challenge the
defendant's regulations imposing various five year moratoria on sewer hookups. In
upholding the moratoria, and ruling that the regulations did not constitute a taking, the
court focused on the purpose of the governmental action:
It may be said that the state takes property by eminent domain because it is
useful to the public, and under the police power because it is harmful ....
From this results the difference between the power of eminent domain and the
police power, that the former recognizes [sic] a right to compensation, while the
latter on principle does not.
Id. at 1382, quoting E. FmuNn, THE Poucn Powun. § 511, at 546-47 (1904).
1977]
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B. California's "Or Damaged" Clause
Although policy considerations alone should dictate that there need
not be a physical intrusion as a prerequisite to compensation, additional
support for this position may be found in the eminent domain provision
of the California Constitution. Article 1, section 19 provides that
"[p]rivate property may be taken or damaged for public use only when
just compensation . . .has first been paid . . . . 35 This provision
provides a greater degree of protection to landowners by specifically
requiring that compensation be paid when property has been "dam-
aged" by a public use. However, the majority in HFH cast doubt upon
the meaning of the "or damaged" clause. It characterized the action
taken by the City of Cerritos as having merely diminished the value of a
parcel of land rather than as having "damaged" the parcel.3" The court
emphasized that the economic damage was the indicia by which the
court measured the amount of compensation to be awarded when prop-
erty is physically damaged.17  Although it first appeared that the
court may have been requiring that there be a physical intrusion before
the "or damaged" provision of the California Constitution is applicable,
the court later retreated from this position.38
This use of a physical impairment test as a cornerstone for distin-
guishing between proper exercise of the police power and improper
"damagings" is not supported by case law. As Justice Clark pointed
out in his dissent in HFH, the "or damaged" language, while having
been applied to physical damagings, has not been limited solely to such
situations:
35. CAL.. CONST. art. 1, § 19. The damage clause was introduced precisely for the
purpose of enlarging the scope of compensable claims. See Van Alstyne, supra note 1,
See also Chicago v. Taylor, 125 U.S. 161, 166-67 (1888); Bacich v. Board of Control,
23 Cal. 2d 343, 350, 144 P.2d 818, 823 (1943); Reardon v. San Francisco, 66 Cal. 492,
501-02 (1885).
36. 15 Cal. 3d at 517-18, 542 P.2d at 244, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 372.
37. Id.
38. Initially, footnote 15 stated:
As we explained in Holtz v. Superior Court... "Our decision in the instant case,
and the Albers decision more generally, in effect recognize that, under article I,
section 14 [present article I, section 19] physical damages proximately resulting
from a public improvement must be considered as a direct 'cost' as the property
actually condemned or the materials actually utilized in its construction." Thus,
while we have not hesitated to afford individuals the full measure of the protection
indicated by the history of article I, section 19, no California case has ever inter-
preted the "or damaged" phrase of our state Constitution to cover mere diminution
of market value of property.
Id. at 518, 542 P.2d at 244, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 372 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
However, in the order denying a rehearing (January 9, 1976), without further explana-
tion, the entire first sentence of the above quoted original footnote was deleted. Thus no
[Vol. 10448
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In fact, in Reardon v. San Francisco, . . . this court rejected such an
interpretation, noting that the word damaged "refers to something more
than a direct or immediate damage to private property, such as its
invasion or spoliation. There is no reason why this word should be
construed in any other than its ordinary and popular sense. It em-
braces more than the taking."89
C. Use as a Compensable Interest in California
In California an expanded view of property has been recognized in
eminent domain cases.4 0 Under this rationale, if the use of property has
been impaired, the impairment should qualify as damage under the
California Constitution.
41
allusion to a requirement of physical invasion remains. Nonetheless this appears to be
the only rationale to explain the court's decision as to the "or damaged" clause. Id. at
522, 542 P.2d at 247, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
39. 15 Cal. 3d at 523, 542 P.2d at 248, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 376 (Clark, J., dissent-
ing) (citations omitted).
40. Particularly worth noting is the language in several California zoning cases
recognizing that restriction of uses of private property by regulation may be unconstitu-
tional without compensation.
[f the use is so far restricted and the value depreciated that it can be said that
the regulation goes too far, it will be deemed a taking of the property, in which
event the ordinance becomes invalid and unconstitutional, because the taking is
without due process of law.
Bank of America v. Atherton, 60 Cal. App. 2d 268, 273, 140 P.2d 678, 681 (1943).
In People ex rel Stevenot v. Associated Oil Co., 211 Cal. 93, 294 P. 717 (1930), the
principle is more explicitly stated:
The difficulty usually arises in determining whether the particular right sought to
be regulated or prohibited is subject to such regulation or prohibition and whether
in the particular case the legislature has gone too far with the resultant unlawful
taking. It may not be disputed that the use of private property is a right as much
entitled to protection as the property itself, and an undue restriction on the use
thereof is as much a taking "for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroy-
ing it."
Id. at 99-100, 294 P. at 721, quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,
415 (1922).
This discussion from Pennsylvania Coal was more recently repeated in Candlestick
Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 11 Cal. App. 3d
557, 572, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897, 906 (1970), where the police power regulation and resulting
refusal to allow plaintiff to fill its bay property was upheld as valid. See also Turner v.
County of Del Norte, 24 Cal. App. 3d 311, 101 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1972).
41. The case of Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 144 P.2d 818 (1943) was
significant in determining whether California eminent domain policy would take a
limiting or expansive direction. The immediate queston in Bacich was whether a
property owner could collect compensation for impairment of his right of ingress and
egress through the vehicle of an inverse condemnation action. The court ultimately
decided that impairment of the right of access was compensable because the harm was
unique to that property. The court candidly spoke of the policy rationale for its
decision:
If the question is one of first impression its answer depends chiefly upon matters
of policy, a factor the nature of which, although at times discussed by the courts,
is usually left undisclosed.
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In Southern California Edison Co. v. Bourgerie,42 for example, a
restrictive covenant in a deed was found to be "property" for purposes
of the just compensation clause of the California Constitution. There,
an adjoining landowner claimed damages because of the proposed con-
struction of an electric power substation on his neighbor's land where
both properties were burdened with provisions prohibiting such use of
the land. The court found that the individual property owner who
would be hurt by the violation of the restriction should not be forced to
bear the entire damage alone. The court declared that one seeking a
share in the condemnation award need not prove the existence of an
estate or interest in the property. Rather, public policy and fairness
would determine the distribution of the burdens as between the individ-
ual and the public.
43
The California Supreme Court has also been liberal in extending
compensation to the taking of property interests for which, traditionally,
there had been no possibility of compensation. 4 For example, in
County of San Diego v. Miller,45 the court found that the holder of an
unexercised option to purchase property, when supported by considera-
tion, was entitled to compensation when that property was taken by the
government. In reaching its conclusion, the court emphasized the im-
portance of fairness and public policy rather than traditional common
law concepts of property:
The constitutional requirement of just compensation derives as much
content from the basic equitable principles of fairness . . . as it does
[O]n the one hand, the policy underlying the eminent domain provision in the
Constitution is to distribute throughout the community the loss inflicted upon the
individual by the making of public improvements. . . . On the other hand, fears
have been expressed that compensation allowed too liberally will seriously impede,
if not stop, beneficial public improvements because of greatly increased cost.
Id. at 350, 144 P.2d at 823.
A strong dissent from Justice Traynor reminded the majority that the constitutional
provision, art. 1, § 14 (presently art. 1, § 19) was created to protect property rights that
already existed and not to create new ones. The dissent focused particularly on the
political basis of the opinion. Id. at 366, 144 P.2d at 832.
42. 9 Cal. 3d 169, 507 P.2d 964, 107 Cal. Rptr. 76 (1973).
43. Id. at 173, 507 P.2d at 967, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 78.
[Tihe violation of a building restriction could cause far greater damage in mone-
tary value to a property owner than the appropriation of a mere right of way.
To establish a substantive distinction by merely labeling one a property interest
for which compensation must be made and the other a mere contractual right which
may be appropriated by a condemnor without any compensation is inequitable and
rationally indefensible.
Id., 507 P.2d at 966-67, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 77-78.
44. Other interests held to constitute property for condemnation compensation purpos-
es include: fee interests, leaseholds, easements and rights-of-way. See County of San
Diego v. Miller, 13 Cal. 3d 684, 688, 532 P.2d 139, 141, 119 Cal. Rptr. 491, 493 (1975).
45. 13 Cal. 3d 684, 532 P.2d 139, 119 Cal. Rptr. 491 (1975).
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from technical concepts of property law ... [T]he right to compen-
sation is to be determined by whether the condemnation has deprived
the claimant of a valuable right rather than by whether his right can
technically be called an 'estate' or 'interest' in the land.
4 6
IV. DEVELOPMENTS IN CALIFORNIA LAW
Several recent California cases have awarded compensation to the
landowner when downzoning was ancilliary to some other governmental
activity. In Klopping v. City of Whittier,47 the city announced its
intention to acquire the plaintiff's land through condemnation, but
unreasonably delayed the condemnation proceedings. The court held
that the loss of use suffered by property owners, specifically the loss of
rental income due to this "condemnation cloud," was recoverable, either
as a "de facto taking" or as a damaging of the property.48  The court in
Kopping analogized the situation to that of a harsh zoning regulation
which is "often calculatingly designed to decrease any future condemna-
tion award. 49
Similarly, in Peacock v. County of Sacramento,5" the county passed a
severe height restriction on property in order to leave sufficient over-
flight airspace for the anticipated acquisition and development of a
neighboring airport. This had the effect of eliminating activities such as
golfing from the possible uses of the land. This police power activity
was held to be a taking of the property by inverse condemnation, on the
rationale that the property was taken as a prelude to eventual public
acquisition.5
46. Id. at 691, 532 P.2d at 143, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 495 (emphasis in original) (cita-
tion omitted).
The federal courts have also liberally extended the application of the constitutional
guarantee of compensation, emphasizing the fairness element. For example, making low
altitude flights of army and navy aircraft over a commercial chicken farm, and thereby
destroying the use of the property was held to be a taking of property in United States v.
Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946). The court held it immaterial that the land was not
physically occupied, as the owner's loss was as severe as it would have been from a more
conventional entry onto the land. Similarly, in Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S.
84, rehearing denied, 369 U.S. 857 (1962), the owner and operator of an airport was
held liable for rendering plaintiff's property unusable as a residence because of excessive
noise.
47. 8 Cal. 3d 39, 500 P.2d 1345, 104 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1972).
48. Id. at 46, 500 P.2d at 1351, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 7. The KIopping case is also useful
as an illustration of non-physical compensable damage.
49. Id.
50. 271 Cal. App. 2d 845, 77 Cal. Rptr. 391 (1969).
51. Id. at 862, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 403. Professor Van Alstyne has criticized this result,
emphasizing the
unfortunate tendency of the existing law of inverse condemnation as it relates to
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Further, in Sneed v. County of Riverside,5 2 the county imposed a
three inch height restriction on property adjoining an airport. This was
deemed to be a taking of the air navigation easement-requiring that
compensation be paid to the aggrieved property owner-in spite of the
valid safety concerns which motivated the regulation. 5
However, in Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto,54 the city government
reclassified 750 acres of foothill property as permanent open space,
thereby limiting development to one single family dwelling unit for
every ten acres. The area in question had been annexed to the city in
reliance on the city's promise to continue the then-existing residential
classification which allowed one single family unit per acre.55 In effect,
the reclassification required that nine out of every ten acres be left
totally undeveloped and unused.
Initially, the court of appeal found that the plaintiff had stated a
cause of action in inverse condemnation, reasoning that "a comprehen-
sive land use zoning ordinance is not immune from the rule that where
the regulation goes too far, it will be recognized as a taking."' 0 A re-
excessive use of the police power to treat issues on an all or nothing basis: either
the regulation is valid, or it constitutes a compensable taking.
Comment, Taking, supra note 1, at 70 n.327. To avoid these extremes, he suggests the
use of partial compensation, installment payment of judgments, bond issues, or relief
framed in the alternative, as an incomplete list of possibilities.
An alternative method of balancing the effect of zoning regulations on property
owners (some gain while others lose economic value) has been developed by Professor
Donald Hagman. Hagman, Book Review, 87 HDv. L. Rav. 482 (1973). In his review
of The Taking Issue, Hagman suggests the use of special assessment techniques which
redistribute the benefits from those whose land is reclassified to a higher use (windfalls)
to those who bear disproportionate burdens from downzonings of their property (wipe-
outs). Additionally significant is Professor Hagman's discussion of Professor Coston-
is' density transfer system. This system permits an owner who is prevented from
developing his or her property to sell the unused development right to one who receives
an increased development classification. Id. at 493.
52. 218 Cal. App. 2d 205, 32 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1963).
53. Id. CAL. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 50485.2 (West Supp. 1976) (Airport Approaches
Zoning Law) defines and authorizes the elimination of airport hazards "by appropriate
exercise of the police power or the authority . . . ." granted in CAL. PUn. UTIL. CODE
ANN. § 21653 (West Supp. 1976). Section 21653 provides that acquisition of property
interests not constituting the entire fee, through condemnation, is proper where airport
activity takes less than the total fee. Thus, the legislature may have recognized, at
least in part, that severe regulation of private property for a valid public purpose may
constitute an unconstitutional taking of a property interest which can be remedied by
an action in inverse condemnation.
54. 51 Cal. App. 3d 726, 124 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1975), rehearing granted, 57 Cal. App.
3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1976).
55. Id. at 727-28, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 549, rehearing granted, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129
Cal. Rptr. 575 (1976).
56. Id. at 740, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 556, citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
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hearing of the issue was granted" in light of HFH, and the court found
that the ordinances were valid exercises of the police power.58 Thus,
they were beyond constitutional attack except in proceedings for dam-
ages in inverse condemnation. The court declared, however, that while
[a] zoning action which merely decreases the market value of property
does not violate the constitutional provisions forbidding uncompensated
taking or damaging .. .where the [zoning] action goes beyond the
mere diminution of market value, nd instead has the substantial effect
of depriving the landowner of any seasonable or beneficial use of his
property, the rule does not necessarily apply.59
In Eldridge, while there was no physical invasion of, nor harm to the
property, it would appear that a "taking" had occurred, for many of the
uses to which the property may have been put were rendered impermis-
sible. The court of appeal on rehearing held, therefore, that plaintiffs
stated a cause of action for damages in inverse condemnation against
the city. 0
The HFH court distinguished Kopping, Peacock, Sneed and the ini-
tial Eldridge decision. The majority recognized three situations in
which downzoning may give rise to a cause of action in inverse
condemnation."' It categorized these as distinct problems arising
from inequitable zoning actions which are undertaken by a pub-
lic agency. These inequities can occur either as a prelude to public
acquisition, or as an evasion of the requirement that the state acquire the
property which it intends to use for a public purpose.6 2  In both
Kopping and Peacock, downzoning was used as a prelude to eventual
public acquisition of the property, while in Sneed an actual public use of
the property was undertaken. However, the policy which underlies
granting compensation to individuals who suffer from unreasonable
governmental activity should not require that a distinction be drawn
between situations in which the government intends to acquire the land
for its own actual use, and where it is merely using its powers to down-
zone the property for some other public purpose. In both cases the
U.S. 393, 415 (1922), rehearing granted, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575
(1976).
57. 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1976).
58. Id. at 631, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 587 (1976).
59. Id. at 624, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 581.
60. Id. at 633, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 587.
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property owner sustains a loss as a direct result of the governmental
action.
The court in HFH characterized the plaintiffs' loss as their inability to
obtain profit from the sale of their land.64 The court cited"8 McCarthy
v. City of Manhattan Beach60 for the proposition that mere diminution
in value due to zoning regulation was not compensable. In Mc-
Carthy, the city had passed an ordinance permitting only recreational
activities on plaintiffs' ocean front land. The owners intended to build
houses on the land and brought suit asking the court to declare the
ordinance void. The ordinance was held not to constitute a confiscatory
taking of property, absent a showing that the beach frontage could not
be used in any profitable manner in accordance with the zoning ordi-
nance. 6
7
Similarly, in Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. City of Los
Angeles,6" a zoning ordinance which prevented rock and gravel opera-
tions on plaintiff's land was held to be valid in spite of the fact that the
property had "no appreciable economic value" for any other purpose
because of the nature of the property and the weather. Further, it was
of no value for the purpose for which it was rezoned, agricultural use.
The court quoted from Hadacheck v. Sebastian,69 among other cases,
characterizing the state's police power as "one of the most essential
powers of government, one that is the least limitable.170
The HFH court, in relying on McCarthy7l and Consolidated Rock7 2
failed to consider the difference between whether any damage or taking
had occurred, and whether diminution in value should be the measure of
recovery when compensation is due.73  Diminution of value is only one
64. Id. at 523, 542 P.2d at 247, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
65. Id. at 514 n.10, 542 P.2d at 241 n.10, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 369 n.10.
66. 41 Cal. 2d 879, 264 P.2d 932 (1953).
67. The city was attempting to keep the price of the property at a lower level in
anticipation of a future condemnation, which had been postponed because of inadequate
funds. The court suggested that the property might be beneficially used as a private
beach. Id. at 890, 264 P.2d at 940.
68. 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36
(1962). See also Spindler Realty Corp. v. Manning, 243 Cal. App. 2d 255, 53 Cal.
Rptr. 7, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 975 (1966).
69. 239 U.S. 394 (1915). In Hadacheck, a Los Angeles ordinance which made the
manufacturing of bricks within the city unlawful was upheld by the United States
Supreme Court. Id.
70. Id. at 410.
71. 41 Cal. 2d 879, 264 P.2d 932 (1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 817 (1954).
72. 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36
(1962).
73. 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365.
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factor for consideration in determining whether the burden borne by the
individual property owner is reasonable.7 4 This factor alone should not
be determinative in awarding or denying compensation. In fact, the
majority failed to consider Justice Holmes' well known opinion in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,"5 which has been recognized by
California courts to be the ruling authority on this subject.76  In that
case, an injunction was sought to prevent a coal company from mining
beneath city streets. 7 In declaring that an ordinance, forbidding the
extraction of coal from beneath the, surface, was invalid without pay-
ment of compensation, Holmes recognized that when the exercise of the
police power is unreasonable or excessive it may amount to a taking of
property. He stated that the
[gjovernment hardly could go on if to some extent values could not be
diminished without paying for every such change in the general law. As
long recognized some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation
and must yield to the police power. But obviously the implied limita-
tion must have its limits or the contract and due process clauses are
gone. One fact for consideration in determining such limits is the
extent of diminution. When it reaches a certain magnitude, in most
if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and
compensation to sustain the act.
78
74. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
75. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
76. As the court in Eldridge stated in an opinion which was vacated in light of HFH,
"Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, . . . has been widely and consistently followed and
must be deemed the ruling authority on the subject before us." 124 Cal. Rptr. at 552, 51
Cal. App. 3d at 734.
77. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
78. Id. at 413. In discussing the fifth and fourteenth amendments' protection of
private property he noted:
When this seemingly absolute protection is found to be qualified by the police
power, the natural tendency of human nature is to extend the qualification more
and more until at last private property disappears. But that cannot be accom-
plished in this way under the Constitution of the United States. The general rule
at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. . . . In general it is not plain
that a man's misfortunes or necessities will justify his shifting the damages to his
neighbor's shoulders. We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire
to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by
a shorter cut than the Constitutional way of paying for the change.
Id. at 415-16 (citations omitted).
The rationale used by Holmes to invalidate the statute in Pennsylvania Coal, that
severe regulations may effect takings of private property, was reiterated by the United
States Supreme Court more recently in Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590
(1962). In Goldblatt, the Court upheld an ordinance prohibiting an excavation below
the water table as a valid exercise of the police power. This was allowed despite the fact
that it completely destroyed the utility of plaintiff's land for mining of sand and gravel.
Citing Pennsylvania Coal, the Court reiterated:
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Although Holmes' language suggests that just compensation must be
paid for a police power action which results in an excessive devaluation
of property, the plaintiff in Pennsylvania Coal79 sought only monetary
relief.
The HFH dissent, on the other hand, received Pennsylvania Coal as
bearing significantly on the subject, citing it extensively in support of the
balancing of policies required to determine when compensation is due.80
Fairness requires consideration of public needs and private losses,
whether they result from downzoning or other governmental action.8'
Moreover, the federal courts have recently recognized the balancing
process in a group of cases arising from actions taken by the City of
Palo Alto.82 In Dahl v. City of Palo Alto88 the court denied a motion
to dismiss, holding that a cause of action had been stated in inverse
condemnation. 4 The court concluded that
[t]he determination of reasonableness is a factual one encompassing the
interests of the public, the appropriateness of the means, and the oppres-
siveness of the action.85
The court stated that the question on a motion to dismiss is only
whether the plaintiff would be entitled to relief if the facts, as alleged,
are proved at trial; allegations that the regulation is arbitrary, capri-
cious, and allows the plaintiff no reasonable use of his land are suffi-
cient to state a cause of action.86
This is not to say, however, that governmental action in the form of regulation
cannot be so onerous as to constitute a taking which constitutionally requires com-
pensation. There is no set formula to determine where regulation ends and taking
begins .... How far regulation may go before it becomes a taking we need not
now decide ....
369 U.S. 590, 594 (1961).
79. 260 U.S. 322 (1922).
80. 15 Cal. 3d at 524, 542 P.2d at 248, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 376-77.
81. Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89
(1961), modified, 57 Cal. 2d 488 (1976).
82. See discussion in text at notes 108-17 supra.
83. 372 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Cal. 1974). Dahl resulted from a factual situation
similar to Eldrfidge. See also Arastra Limited Partnership v. City of Palo Alto, 401 F.
Supp. 962 (N.D. Cal. 1976). There, the plaintiff brought an action in inverse condemna-
tion, alleging that the open space zoning regulations enacted by the city were actually
passed for the purpose of acquiring a scenic outlook for their new park. The court held
that the ordinance was eqivalent to a taking in fee simple absolute where the use was so
severely restricted that it was virtually unmarketable, and where ostensible purposes for
the ordinance were non-existent.
84. 372 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
85. Id.
86. Id. In another federal case, Brown v. Tahoe, 385 F. Supp. 1128 (D. Nev. 1973),
the plaintiffs in a class action alleged that a land use ordinance adopted by the Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency substantially destroyed the value of their property, and that
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However, in HFH, similar allegations did not suffice to send the
question to the jury. While recognizing that a significant problem exists,
the court refused to resolve it; rather it decided to categorically burden
those individuals whose property is merely diminished in value. 7  The
court reasoned that regardless of how burdensome the financial loss may
be to the landowner, the detriment must be borne as the price of living
in our society.88 Finally, HFH states that wrongfulness is irrelevant to
the ordinance was, in effect, a dedication of their property for public use. The court
held that
public welfare and necessity may reasonably require exceptionally restrictive land
use classification for the protection of the public interests . . . but that such valid
regulations may nevertheless constitute a taking of private property for public use
entitling the owner to just compensation.
Id. at 1132.
A potential defense raised in these cases is federal abstention from the state issues.
This has been considered and rejected in three recent federal district court cases. In
Donohoe C. Co. v. Maryland-National C.P. & P. Comm'n, 398 F. Supp. 21 (D. Md.
1975), where a property owner brought an action to recover compensation for the taking
of his property by zoning regulations, the court raised the issue of abstention, sua sponte,
holding that the issues presented did not require application of the abstention doctrine.
Noting that federal and Maryland constitutional law shared the same ambiguities, the
court stated:
There are advantages to abstention, but they are advantages purchased at a high
price. . . . For that reason, the federal courts should abstain from exercising
their jurisdiction only in those situations where deferring to state adjudication is
likely to avert real harm. . . . Where state and federal constitutional issues are
identical, nothing of sufficient substance is gained to offset the price of abstention.
Id. at 30.
In Smoke Rise, Inc. v. Washington Suburban San. Comm'n, 400 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Md.
1975) (see note 34 supra for a discussion of the facts), the court held first, that the
plaintiffs were not required to exhaust their administrative remedies, as Maryland law
provided no suitable administrative appeal procedure. Secondly, it concluded that the
court could properly exercise jurisdiction "due to a federal question arising under the
United States Constitution." Id. at 1372.
Finally, in M.J. Brock & Sons, Inc. v. City of Davis, 401 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Cal.
1975), a property owner brought an action alleging that the general plan and zoning
adopted by the city had so deprived it of the use of its land as to constitute an unlawful
taking. The court found that there was no valid reason for federal abstention where
questions of whether a taking had occurred under the fifth and fourteenth amendments
would not be resolved by the determination of other issues on the state level. The
court further noted:
It is true that a local land use regulatory scheme is the subject of concern here,
but the exercise of federal court jurisdiction by no means constitutes unnecessary
interference because the federal questions of taking, deprivation of civil rights are
at the center of this suit.
Id. at 357-58.
The court also refused to dismiss the action, citing Dahi for the purpose of showing
the sufficiency of plaintiffs allegations that the property had been rendered "substan-
tially valueless so as to constitute an unlawful taking." 401 F. Supp. at 359.
Given these rulings, it appears likely that the federal courts will be a most effective
forum to provide relief for landowners in future cases. See text accompanying notes
108-16 infra.
87. 15 Cal. 3d at 521, 542 P.2d at 246, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
88. Id. at 515-60, 542 P.2d at 242, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 370.
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the granting of the cause of action in inverse condemnation.80 How-
ever, each situation which the court recognized as a distinct problem,
-Kopping, Peacock and Sneed-involved governmental fault or
wrongfulnessY0 These cases do not represent distinct problems; they
represent merely distinct judicial attitudes toward the same problem.
V. SOLUTION
Condemnation law necessarily involves policy decisions. The real
issue is the extent to which the individual ought to be burdened, or can
be fairly required to subsidize public projects. The pervading issue
revolves around the circumstances which should exist to allow the case
to go to the jury. Clearly, monetary relief will not be proper in all
circumstances.
When other constitutional rights are involved payment of compensa-
tion will not remove the constitutional objection.91 For example, due
process objections to zoning arise in a variety of circumstances. Zoning
restrictions may be attacked as arbitrary and irrelevant to the public
interest. In such a case, monetary relief would be inappropriate and the
zoning ordinance should be invalidated. 2 However, when the sole
objection is that the zoning ordinance places an unreasonable burden on
the individual, the ordinance may be said to constitute a taking for
which just compensation should be paid.
89. Id. at 516 n.13, 542 P.2d at 242-43 n.13, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 370-71 n.13.
90. See note 13 supra.
91. Also there will be cases where the damage is de minimus and uncompensable.
92. A zoning ordinance may be attacked as a violation of basic notions of equal
opportunity in a market economy, and or as a violation of other due process require-
ments, including equal protection under the law.
Many commentators have noted the pervasiveness of special influence in determining
zoning plans, particularly at the local level. Consider the following example: A
regulation is passed that downzones one property owner's C-2 (commercial) classifica-
tion to O-S (open space) in order to eliminate potential competition from another
property owner. Both are in the supermarket business, one an established member of the
community with influence on the powers that be, the other a newcomer intending to build
a competing market. In such a situation, payment of money damages for the taking of
property to save the zoning ordinance would not be in the public interest. Here the
public gain from the measure is zero, or negative, and the loss to the potential competitor
is excessive. There is no basis for the exercise of the zoning power.
The elimination of competition with the city presents a slightly different situation. In
Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Co. v. Los Angeles, 241 F. 912 (D.C.S.D. Cal. 1917), the court
held that the city could compel private companies to remove and relocate their electric
poles and instrumentalities in order to install a municipal system, but that this was an
appropriation of the companies' property and required payment of compensation. See
also Van Sicklen v. Browne, 15 Cal. App. 3d 122, 92 Cal. Rptr. 786 (1971).
Other discriminatory zoning regulations may irreparably damage constitutional rights
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Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.93 is a case which first pre-
sented the question of the constitutionality of a comprehensive zoning
ordinance to the United States Supreme Court, establishing a presump-
tion of validity for comprehensive zoning plans. 94 However, Euclid en-
visioned the possible necessity of court interference:
[when the provisions of an ordinance are] concretely applied to par-
ticular premises . . . or to particular conditions . . . some of them,
or even many of them may be found to be arbitrary and unreasonable. 95
by eliminating racial minorities, the aged, infirm or poor from a community. A zoning
regulation that is demonstrated to have, for example, racial discrimination as its sole
purpose is rightly enjoined. The substitution of money damages to the dispossessed
property owner would not cure the constitutional deficiency.
In Seattle Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928), the Seattle zoning regulations
were amended to prohibit the building of a philanthropic home for the aged in a
residential district unless approved by two-thirds of the neighboring property owners. A
writ of mandate issued to compel the Superintendant of Building of the City of Seattle to
issue the building permit to the plaintiff, striking down the amendment This case
illustrates the use of mandamus to invalidate a discriminatory regulation, where money
damages would have been inappropriate.
Similarly, in Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969), an ordinance which required
the approval of the voters in Akron, Ohio, before the enactment of any fair housing
ordinance was declared unconstitutional. But in James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137
(1971), a similar provision in the California constitution requiring local voter approval
for low-rent housing was upheld since it dealt with economic, not racial, discrimination.
Zoning restrictions which are intended to eliminate low-cost housing from a community,
and the general economic segregation which is perpetuated by zoning, known as a form
of "exclusionary" land-use controls, are clearly discriminatory, but may not be unconsti-
tutional. In Miller v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 331 (1925), in an
opinion strongly supporting wide zoning powers and private residential districts, the court
recognized that some municipalities have
under the guise of zoning, sought to enact and enforce unreasonable and discrim-
inatory ordinances. Some of these attempted regulations have been palpably for
the exclusive and preferential benefit of particular localities.
Id. at 489, 234 P. at 381. For the purposes of this topic, suffice it to say that if such
ordinances are found to be unconstitutional, inverse condemnation would not be the
appropriate remedy.
93. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
94. Id. at 395. Recently the California Supreme Court reaffirmed the holding in
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 10 Cal. 3d 110, 514 P.2d 111, 109 Cal. Rptr. 799 (1973),
by rejecting claims of inverse condemnation based only upon the adoption of a general
plan, even though it indicated potential taking of private property for a public use.
If the plan is implemented by the county in the future in such manner as to actu-
ally affect plaintiff's free use of his property, the validity of the county's action
may be challenged at that time.
Id. at 118, 514 P.2d at 116, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 804.
95. 272 U.S. at 9-5. This course of action was followed in Nectow v. City of
Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1923), two years later when a zoning ordinance which
included the plaintiff's land in a residential district was successfully challenged as a
violation of the fourteenth amendment since there was no showing of public gain in the
measure and serious damage to the owner. The emergence of special exceptions,
permits, conditional and nonconforming use permits and other techniques have eliminat-
ed many potential Nectow challenges.
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The majority in HFH found the facts in the case to be almost identical
to those in the Euclid case:
Tendering allegations almost identical to those urged here, the appellee
in Euclid claimed . . . . The court upheld the zoning against the
claim that it constituted a taking of the property in question, settling
some half century ago the question in the instant case.96
The HFH court refused to recognize that the law has undergone a
period of substantial change since Euclid upheld zoning as a valid
method of land use planning. In fact, the courts have begun to recog-
nize that zoning changes may have a significant impact on property
values. Moreover, there has been recognition by the courts that unrea-
sonable governmental action may severely burden individual landown-
ers.97  Thus, HFH relies on outmoded concepts of the propriety of
comprehensive zoning regulations.
It is questionable whether injunctive relief will restore the landowner
to his original position. 95 Limiting the landowner's remedy to non-
monetary relief in such situations encourages private interests to obstruct
the future development of the community. It gives property owners the
ability to hinder projects which may be just beyond constitutionality, but
are entertained for the good of the community. Once it has been
determined that a landowner has suffered an unreasonable burden,99
the goal of the courts should be to allocate the burden in a fair and
96. 15 Cal. 3d at 514-15, 542 P.2d at 241-42, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 369-70.
97. See, e.g., Peacock v. County of Sacramento, 271 Cal. App. 2d 845, 77 Cal. Rptr.
391 (1969); Sneed v. County of Riverside, 218 Cal. App. 2d 205, 32 Cal. Rptr. 318
(1963). See also note 51 supra and accompanying text.
98. In Kissinger v. City of Los Angeles, 161 Cal. App. 2d 454, 327 P.2d 10 (1958),
injunctive relief was permitted against governmeiftal precondemnation activity. In
Kissinger, the city was unable or unwilling to condemn plaintiff's property until some
time in the future, because it was awaiting the election results on a bond issue. In grant-
ing the injunction, the court noted:
[W]here, as here, the facts are such as to show an attempt to exercise the police
power in such a manner as to oppress or discriminate against an individual or
individuals we are entitled to give weight to the evidence disclosing a purpose other
than that declared by the ordinance in determining its validity. A zoning ordinance
may not be used as a device to take property for public use without the payment
of compensation.
Id. at 462, 327 P.2d at 16 (citations omitted). See also Bank of America v. Atherton, 60
Cal. App. 2d 268, 140 P.2d 678 (1943).
Although the injunction was issued in Kissinger, it would be insightful to note how
much the owner sacrificed financially in the process of fighting the unconstitutional
governmental action. Undoubtedly, the loss of use of the property during the period of
time that the issue was litigated was, in itself, a significant hardship.
99. The fact that the burden placed on the owner is a partial deprivation of use and
not a total loss is irrelevant. The HFH majority erroneously distinguished between the
two situations. When the zoning regulation destroys some but not all of the market
value of a parcel of land, the majority in HFH prefers to utilize the benefit-burden
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equitable manner.100 Allowing the owner to bring a cause of action in
inverse condemnation will allow the court to flexibly make such read-
justments where they are appropriate. 101
Faced with this delicate issue, several courts have evolved various
approaches to the determination of when an action for inverse condem-
nation will lie. A flexible approach was recently taken in Massachu-
approach to determine if compensation is due. But that determination should be made
based on the reasonableness of the situation. The problems with emphasizing the
balancing were well considered by the lower court in the same case:
With the current emphasis on such goals and objectives in the face of the modem
urbanization explosion, we must never lose sight of the fact that individual property
owners should not unreasonably be forced to carry the cost of achieving goals which
are to the benefit of the entire community. Under our system of private property
it is to be expected that the public will bear the cost of public improvements.
41 Cal. App. 3d 908, 915, 116 Cal. Rptr. 436, 440-41 (1974), vacated, 15 Cal. 3d 508,
542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365, cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1495 (1975).
[This position] if carried to its logical extreme, could result in the price to be
paid being increased to total loss of his private possessions. The safeguard against
that result is the constitutional provision preventing a taking or damaging of pri-
vate property without just compensation.
Id. at 916, 116, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 441. The HFH lower court analogized to the constitu-
tional protection against unreasonable search and seizure even in crime-ridden urban
areas:
Thus it is no more valid for the government, in the exercise of its police powers,
to visit financial deprivation on the owner of private property in the name of zon-
ing, than to impair his constitutional liberty in the name of suppressing crime.
Id., 116 Cal. Rptr. 441.
Just as valuable evidence obtained in an illegal search and seizure is tainted by these
means, valuable environmental projects, accomplished at the expense of constitutional
concerns, are also tainted.
100. An analogy is suggested by the discussion in J. FLEMNG, AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE LAW OF TORTS (1967), of the regulatory role of the law of torts in the adjustment of
economic losses due to accidents. In Great Britain, prior to 1961, the economic burden
of highway accidents caused by negligent maintenance of roads fell upon the individual
victims due to the immunity from claims enjoyed by the highway authorities. This
immunity "fell to the axe of reform" long after the establishment of modem taxation:
the public character of the highway authorities, formerly the excuse for no liability,
furnished the structure for a wide distribution of the losses. Fleming generalizes from
this as follows:
Besides-and this is pertinent to all claims for immunity in whatever guise by public
authority-the fact that the risk-creating activity was carried on for the public bene-
fit offers all the more reason why all its beneficiaries should bear a proportionate
share of the incidental loss which happens to befall its adventitious victims. For
it is an unquestionable solecism in the grammar of modem democracy to demand
from an individual that he sacrifice himself to the State and then to fob him off
with the glib consolation that this is but the toll which misfortune occasionally
and at random exacts in return for the benefits to be derived from membership.
If the public benefits, let it pay its own way!
Id. at 12-13. Downzoning enjoys just such an immunity from claims in its capacity to
regulate for the public good while it inflicts severe losses randomly upon innocent
citizens.
101. The dissent in HFH noted that, assuming the invalidity of the zoning ordinance,
the condemning agency is allowed alternative methods of proceeding once the landowner
has established his or her cause of action in inverse condemnation. These include
compensating the owner for the decrease in value, purchasing the land, and rescinding
the regulation. 15 Cal. 3d at 527, 542 P.2d at 250, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
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setts, in Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe & Co.,1 0 2 where
the court attempted to balance the ecological interest in protecting the
marine life of Broad Marsh, and the constitutional rights of the land-
owner who was planning to fill the marsh in preparation for the con-
struction of homes.' 0 s The court remanded the case with instructions to
the lower court to make further findings on the suitability of the land for
other uses, and on the difference in the fair market value of the land
with and without the limitations.
In Lomarch Corp. v. Mayor & Common Council of Englewood,0 4
a case involving precondemnation activities, the New Jersey Supreme
Court acknowledged the possibility of recognizing the equivalent of an
option to purchase the property for the time it was unusable, even
during litigation, allowing compensation in money damages as well as
an injunction.
Finally, in Bydlon v. United States,10 5 the court reached an equitable,
albeit unusual, result in awarding money damages equal to the value of
the interest taken. In that case, the federal government was required to
pay about twenty-five percent of the value of the fee estate, which was
the amount of the reduction in value caused by federal police power
ordinance which took the air access rights.10 6
Especially for local governments which are unable to borrow large
sums, the costs of purchasing land may be unnecessarily prohibitive.
Where the public interest requires only that some, but not all, of the
rights and uses of the land be restricted, inverse condemnation would
allow the government to proceed for the public good at the appropriate
cOSt.107
102. 206 N.E.2d 666 (Mass. 1965).
103. Id. at 671, partially quoted in Eldridge v. Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 624,
129 Cal. Rptr. 575, 581 (1976). In that case an ordinance that gave the city a year to
decide whether or not they would condemn land was held to be equivalent to an option
to purchase, which required the payment of compensation to the property owner.
Professor Van Alstyne has pointed out that a policy of compensation in such situations
tends to act as a brake against insensitive or over-enthusiastic administration. It
encourages careful planning and more adequately considered choices between opera-
tional alternatives.
Van Alstyne, supra note 1, at 32.
104. 237 A.2d 881 (N.J. 1968).
105. 175 F. Supp. 891 (Ct. Cl. 1959).
106. Id. at 900, 906-16.
107. The use of inverse condemnation has been criticized because it is feared that
people will take advantage of such a rule by bad faith attacks of zoning ordinances. One
such attack was that it will serve as an excuse to unload properties no longer profitable
to the owners. This fear is not a valid justification for dismissing the entire course of
action. As the California Supreme Court noted in Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 723, 441
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It should be noted that an alternative approach is developing for an
'action in inverse condemnation in the federal courts.""8 By employing
various sections of the Federal Civil Rights Act," 9 plaintiffs have found
a more sympathetic forum in which to redress their grievances against
various political entities for zoning activities. Moreover, a cause of
action may also be stated under the fifth and fourteenth amendments to
the United States Constitution, thereby invoking federal question juris-
diction.1 0
The use of the Federal Civil Rights Act, and more specifically section
1983,"' allows an action against public officials in their official capaci-
ties without running afoul of state and federal sovereign immunity
problems."12  In addition, exhaustion of state remedies has not been a
significant deterrent to these actions. 1 3 Moreover, the current trend in
P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968), the fear of fraudulent claims in a torts context cannot
excuse the frustration of natural justice. It was observed that "in the past, [we] have re-
jected the argument that we should deny recovery upon a legitimate claim because other
fraudulent ones may be urged." Id. at 731, 441 P.2d at 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
108. See Camden Corp. v. Evesham Township, 420 F. Supp. 709 (D.N.J. 1976);
Sanfilippo v. County of Santa Cruz, 415 F. Supp. 1340 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Sotomura
v. County of Hawaii, 402 F. Supp. 95 (D. Hawaii 1975); M.J. Brock & Sons,
Inc. v. City of Davis, 401 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Dahl v. City of Palo Alto, 372
F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Cordeco Dev. Co. v. Vazquez, 354 F. Supp. 1355
(D.P.R. 1972); Inmobiliaria Borinquen Inc. v. Garcia Santiago, 295 F Supp. 203
(D.P.R. 1969); Shellburne, Inc. v. New Castle County, 293 F. Supp. 237 (D. Del.
1968). Cf. Smoke Rise Inc. v. Washington San. Comm'n, 400 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Md.
1975).
109. Civil Rights Acts, §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983,
1985, 1986 (1970).
110. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970). See Mi. Brock & Sons, Inc. v. City of Davis, 401 F.
Supp. 354 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Smoke Rise, Inc. v. Washington Suburban San.
Comm'n, 400 F. Supp. 1369 (C.D. Md. 1975).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
Id. See also Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972), wherein the Supreme
Court refused to treat property rights differently from personal rights for purposes of
civil rights remedies.
112. See, e.g., Sotomura v. County of Hawaii, 402 F. Supp. 95, 101-02 (D. Hawaii
1975); Inmobiliaria Borinquen, Inc. v. Garcia Santago, 295 F. Supp. 203, 205-06 (D.P.R.
1969).
113. See, e.g., Sanfilippo v. County of Santa Cruz, 415 F. Spp. 1340, 1344 (N.D.
Cal. 1976); Inmobiliaria Borinquen, Inc. v. Garcia Santiago, 295 F. Supp. 203, 206
D.P.R. 1969). But cf. Vistomar, Inc. v. Vasquez, 337 F. Supp. 375 (D.P.R.
1971) (exhaustion of state administrative remedies may be required if they are
adequate).
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federal courts is to avoid abstention in these matters." 4
The use of federal question jurisdiction alleviates any problem of
suing a municipality directly," 5 although the amount in controversy
requirement of greater than $10,000 is still applicable."16 Consequent-
ly, a federal cause of action may provide an alternative inverse condem-
nation remedy to unsuccessful plaintiffs' in state courts.
VI. CONCLUSION
By deferring to the legislature, the HFH court disappointed those
hoping for some flexible judicial standard allowing for a case-by-case
definition based upon the balancing of the interests involved.1
7 It
would be unfortunate to allow private property interests to dictate land-
use to the cities. Nonetheless, in some circumstances, through inverse
condemnation, oppressive burdens placed on individual property owners
can be remedied without disrupting public projects.
The case law and principles underlying the concept of inverse con-
demnation are applicable to downzoning and indicate that an action
should lie for inverse condemnation. By allowing such a cause of
action, the court would be able to consider, on the basis of the particular
facts in issue, whether the cost of planning should be borne by the
individual landowner or distributed to those who benefit from the
planning. This would allow the court an alternative to invalidating
those governmental actions considered to be unfair, and thereby accom-
modate the interests of all parties involved.
Joan Patsy Ostroy
114. See Donahoe Constr. Co. v. Maryland-Nat'l Capitol Park and Planning Comm'n,
398 F. Supp. 21 (D. Md. 1975); M.J. Brock & Sons, Inc. v. City of Davis, 401 F. Supp.
354, 357-59 (N.D. Cal. 1975). Cf. Rancho Palos Verdes Corp. v. City of Laguna
Beach, 390 F. Supp. 1004 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (although the court abstained from exercis-
ing jurisdiction, it emphasized that "special circumstances" were present).
115. This applies for injunctive and declaratory relief. See Dahl v. City of Palo Alto,
372 F. Supp. 647, 650 (N.D. Cal. 1974). See also City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S.
507 (1973).
116. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
117. The federal court had the opportunity to reach this question in Dahli v. City of
Palo Alto, 372 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Cal. 1974), a case presenting similar facts to
Eldridge. The court reached a result which is now contrary to California law, as de-
creed by the state supreme court. See notes 83-86 supra and accompanying text. The
federal courts now face a significant dilemma; they can continue to allow this cause
of action, cutting against the grain of the California Supreme Court, or they can over-
rule Dahl and succumb to the tenets of HFH.
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